Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels essay, Against Theory (1982), raises as many
questions as there are responses, concerning terminating the theoretical
enterprise. Clarifying the claim of literary theory – the authorial intention
verse a text’s meaning has long been debated. For one must first recognize if
there is a difference between a text’s meaning and the expression of intention,
which Knapp and Michaels say “rests on a single mistake.” Aside from accurately
employing the method interpretation, one must take in to consideration the
texts function, signifier, intention, and language. Knapp-Michael reference
Stanley Fish, whose book, Is there a Text
in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities (1980), which
helped shape their theoretical issue argument.
The
Knapp-Michaels argument posits that “theory” arises during literary analysis in
an attempt to solve a set of problems – “the function of authorial intention,
status of literary language, and the role of interpretation, assumptions, and
so on. Thus, if authorial intent and meaning are the same, it begs to question
the validity of the theory of interpretation, which at its base is the
exploration of a central idea akin to an epistemological distinction between
knowledge and beliefs: idealism and realism. Furthermore, deciphering between
intention and signifier, and speech and language acknowledges the notion that
proper interpretation highlights non-signification. (Cain,
Finke, et al. p 2492)
Michaels
argues that if one dismisses the position of the subject, and believes only the
intention of the author, then the subject position is an insignificant aspect.
Alternatively, if importance is given to the subject position, then authorial
intent is the only thing that matters. Thus, the argument is to decide which is
more important, interpretation or authorial intent. However, a reader’s
discovery and position must also be considered and whether there is room to
negotiate between the two. And in regard
to authorial intention, if you dismiss what the author intended, meaning has no
relevance to the reader’s position.
Everything
embedded within the text, i.e. text and tables and so on, must be considered.
“Since the point of positive theory is to ground the practice of determining
particular meanings, the positive theorist chooses” reads the author’s words as
an “intentional act.” Alternatively, a negative theorist arrives at the
conclusion that the choice for the reader is between “intentional meaning and
no intention at all.” (p 2501)
Meaning
already exists in language. “Meaning cannot be added to or subtracted from
language because meanings are intentional,” therefore, “no recommendation about
what to do with intention has any bearing on the question of how to interpret
any utterance or text.” Instead, “the epistemological situation of the
interpreter” has more significance. (pp 2501-02)
Numerous
writers have tried to escape the theory’s “epistemological goal” stating “the
beliefs at any stage of interpretation and have concluded that theory’s
epistemological goal is therefore unattainable.” Even taking a neutral stance
in regard to the unattainability of epistemology “undermines the claims of
method but prevents us from ever getting any correct interpretations.” (p 2502)
All
the things embedded in a text are a part of the overall experience and once the
reader realizes the author’s intention, the reader’s experience becomes or is a
part of the literary work. Although each reader will experience something
different because of their position, in this precept, the object exists
independently of the experience, save for descriptive writing which entertains
a thought rather than possessing significant meaning. “The issue in both cases
is the relation between objects and beliefs.” (p 2505)
Knapp
and Michaels go on to state,
For
the realist, the object exists independent of beliefs, and knowledge requires
that we shed our beliefs in a disinterested quest for the object. For the
idealist, who insists that we can never shed our beliefs, knowledge means
recognizing the role beliefs play in constituting their objects. . . .Fried
chooses idealism: objects are made and not found; interpretation is not the art
of construing but the art of constructing. (p 2505)
The
analysis of any text proves invaluable for interpreting it. If an author and
everyone reads a text, and the interpretations vary, the interpretations are
still grounded in the text and therefore valid. However, interpreting the
meaning of a text, which is subjective, constitutes the theory of
interpretation. Fish maintains his position of epistemological idealism by
stating, we are free to use various methods of interpretation at a “literary
institution to expose the strategies by which its canons have been produced and
understood.” Because not everyone can decode a text, critique proves more
valuable, for it is “absolutely essential not only to the maintenance of, but
to the very production of, the objects of its attention.” (p 2505)
Knapp
and Michaels take a pragmatic view in disagreeing with Fish in regard to how
theories operate. For example, Fish believes “a true account of belief must be
a theory about belief.” Whereas Knapp
and Michaels believe “a true account of belief can only be a belief about a belief.” This dispute
represents the difference between theory and Knapp and Michaels’ argument in Against Theory.
In
one respect Fish’s prescription is unusual: it separates the two theoretical
goals of grounding practice and reaching objective truth. It tells us what is
true and how to behave – but not how to behave in order to find out what is
true. (Knapp and Michael’s note, p 2507)
Fish
posits a theory which he believes no one could live by, even if one were
properly persuaded. “The theoretical impulse involves the attempt to separate
things that should not be separated” such as language from speech and knowledge
from beliefs. Knapp and Michaels believes “the separated terms are in fact
inseparable.” Although theory and the practice of, are nothing but “an attempt
to escape practice.” People have been searching for a way to “stand outside
practice in order to govern practice from without,” but Knapp and Michaels
ascertain the concept that a position outside of practice can never be reached,
“that theorists should stop trying, and that the theoretical enterprise should
come to an end.” (p 2506)
Works
Cited:
Cain,
Finke, et al. The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism. 2nd Ed.
New York/London:
Norton, 2010.